The Threat of IS (Islamic State) in Southeast Asia by Jebellie, Neda
ABSTRACT
Terrorism and extremism is not a new phenomenon to Southeast 
Asian countries. Dangerous radical groups such as Abu Sayyaf and 
Jammah Islamyah have carried out dozens of deadly attacks in the 
region. Some of these local terrorist groups are suspected to have links 
with Al Qaeda. The rise of ISIS on the other hand has raised new 
security concerns in Southeast Asia, particularly for those countries 
with majority-Muslim populations. According to oﬃcial reports more 
than 200 people from Southeast Asian have already joined ISIS in 
Syria and Iraq.
Based on the concept of a world-wide Caliphate, which is central 
to its doctrine, ISIS has started to extend its influence to other parts of 
the world, including Southeast Asia. Considering ISIS is much more 
organized and sophisticated than Al Qaeda, there is little doubt of 
ISIS’ possible appeal in Southeast Asia. The current article strives to 
examine the presence and estimate the threat of ISIS in the region with 
a focus on Malaysia and Indonesia.
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Introduction
 Radicalism and terrorism are not new phenomenon in 
Southeast Asia as jihadist groups have long had a foothold in 
this region. In fact, Southeast Asia has much experience with 
dangerous terrorist groups such as Abu Sayyaf in the 
Philippines and Jammah Islamyah in Indonesia. In 1995, Abu 
Sayyaf killed more than 50 people in the southern Philippines. 
In 2002 and 2005, The Bali terrorist attacks by Jammah 
Islamyah caused more than 200 casualties. These atrocities 
and dozens of other Al Qaeda-alleged terrorist attacks clearly 
demonstrate that the region is prone to the influence of 
international terrorism. The Bush administration even labeled 
the region as the “Second Front” in the war on terror. 
Although ASEAN had already designated international 
terrorism a serious security threat in Southeast Asia, the Bali 
bombings highlighted terrorism as the top concern in the 
region.[1] As a result, the 2007 ASEAN summit, showed its 
members responding to terrorism seriously for the first time.
[2] 
 This article strives to examine the  influence of ISIS in 
Southeast Asia to estimate the threat of this new generation of 
terrorism poses to the region. The focus of this research is on 
Malaysia and Indonesia, two majority-Muslim countries. The 
research method utilized is based on content analysis of 
online ISIS materials including websites and social media.
The Rise of ISIS
 ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)  in its current 
form originated in 1999 as Jamaat Tawih Wal Jihad (JTWJ) 
under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the group was involved in the Iraqi 
insurgency and conducted suicide attacks against civilians and 
Iraqi government officials. In 2004, JTWJ pledged allegiance 
to Al-Qaeda and soon assumed the unofficial name of  Al-
Qaeda-Iraq (AQI). AQI merged with other Iraqi insurgent 
groups to form the Mujahedeen Shura Council (MSC). 
Roughly seven months later MSC declared the establishment 
of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) under the leadership of Abu 
Omar al-Baghdadi, claiming Baqubah as its capital city. In 
2010, the then leader of ISIS, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was 
killed in an American-led attack and was replaced by Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi.  Baghdadi began a marked shift in the 
group’s strategy and started to use the internet and social 
media in order to appeal to potential supporters of ISIS across 
the world. The “Breaking the Walls” propaganda campaign 
released by ISIS is one of their first documented attempts at 
implementing its new web-savvy strategy.[3] 
 In June 2014, ISIS proclaimed the establishment of its 
worldwide caliphate (IS) under the leadership of Abu Bakar 
al-Baghdadi.[4] The establishment of this worldwide caliphate 
marked a noticeable shift in the group’s strategy from the 
regional to the international stage. As caliph, Abu Bakar al-
Baghdadi demanded the allegiance of all Muslims around the 
world. The announcement of this caliphate directly 
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questioned the legality and sovereignty of many world 
governments. 
ISIS in Southeast Asia
 Currently several extremist groups in Southeast Asia 
have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Furthermore, up to 200 
Indonesian, 50 Malaysian, 100 Filipinos and even a handful of 
Singaporeans have joined the ISIS mujahedeen in Iraq and 
Syria.[5]
 In fact, the rise of ISIS represents a new chapter of 
radicalism and extremism in Southeast Asia, and the region’s 
governments are acutely aware that ISIS has the potential to 
spawn a new generation of terrorism in the region. The 
similarities between the former challenge of Al Qaeda and the 
current threat of ISIS have increased awareness among 
Southeast Asian authorities over terrorism’s devastating 
legacy in the region.
 In comparison with Al Qaeda, ISIS shows a higher level 
of organization and sophistication which may make its 
ideology more appealing in Southeast Asia. 
Three factors undergird the charm of ISIS in Southeast Asia: 
social media, returning jihadists, and the world wide 
caliphate.
1- Social Media
 New information and communication technologies (ICT) 
not only have revolutionized the world the average person. 
They also play an important role in enabling connections 
among terrorists. ISIS represents a new generation of 
terrorism in its exploitation of these new technologies to 
spread its violent ideology across the globe, including to 
Southeast Asia. Their efforts have already conquered a great 
swathe of social media space through deploying sophisticated 
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web-based strategies to promote their extremist agenda. ISIS’ 
social media presence has easily made the group more 
appealing than Al-Qaeda. The vastly popular social media 
platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have 
proven to be the perfect tools for ISIS to establish its virtual 
Caliphate (e-Caliphate) and to attract e-citizens (e-Ommah). 
Thanks to new ICT, terrorist groups such as ISIS have waged 
informational warfare and have exploited the internet to 
inspire potential supporters across the globe. In this context, 
ISIS tries to demonize its enemies and to legitimize their use 
of violence to convince its audience that they have no choice 
other than to resort to violence. To shift the responsibility for 
their violent acts onto their enemy ISIS jihadists usually 
characterize their enemies as anti-religious demons who are 
suppressing Muslims and damaging their dignity. 
 To analyze the influence of ISIS in Southeast Asia one 
must consider that the digital landscape in of the region is 
expanding rapidly .Younger generations spend most of their 
time on social media and blogs and are inevitably exposed to 
online extremist propaganda. The faster the number of 
internet users in the region grows, the more people will be 
exposed to extremist propaganda online.
 The effects of ICT on ISIS’ presence in Southeast Asia 
can be examined on two levels: first, new communication 
technologies have provided platforms for ISIS to spread its 
ideology within the region. The global network of Islamic 
jihadists can easily influence young Muslims via the internet. 
Thank to electronic media small, local extremist groups which 
were previously geographically isolated can now easily 
communicate with each other and receive inspiration from 
ISIS.
 Online forums, blogs and websites are one of ISIS’ main 
platforms for propaganda in the region. These online 
materials, though in Arabic or Malay, offer their support to 
Islamic State and justify its violent acts by selectively quoting 
religious texts.  Under this framework, ISIS’ enemies are all 
referred as infidels (ر""""""""""""""""فا""""""""""""""""ك ) and their own terrorist recruits as 
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holy warriors . The contents of the jihadist websites usually 
focus on Muslim communities (ة"""""""""""""مأ) under attack, urging their 
religious brothers ( ناو"""""""""""""""خلإا ) to help them and to protect Islam 
at all costs. The jihadist websites also contain instructions for 
building weapons, such as bombs and improvised explosive 
devices.
 Islam al-Busyro is an example of one these propaganda 
outlets. This Indonesian online forum distributes ISIS videos 
and provides tutorials and online discussion forums for its 
followers across the region. This blog is also connected to a 
twitter account which—though suspended for a while–has 
been reactivated and has announced a new associated Twitter 
account.
 These social media accounts may be run directly by ISIS 
jihadists in Iraq and Syria or their sympathizers in Southeast 
Asia. Each of these accounts has thousands of followers which 
prove the appeal of ISIS in the region. Mohd Faris Anuar and 
Muhamad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi, two Malaysians 
identified in an ISIS beheading video, are other examples of 
Southeast Asian involvement in ISIS’ online presence. 
According to official reports, Muhamad Wanndy’s Facebook 
account which used to continuously publish ISIS propaganda 
has just recently been shut down by the Malaysian authorities. 
 ISIS has effectively grasped social media’s potential to 
help establish a virtual presence in Southeast Asia. The videos 
and propaganda of ISIS on YouTube or other social media can 
go viral with the help of the their regional followers. These 
videos are often edited with Hollywood style special effects to 
be more impressive. A few months ago a set of videos were 
uploaded by local IS sympathizers which showed off the 
Abdullah Azzam Academy, a jihadist training camp for 
Southeast Asian children in Syria. The academy was 
established for the children of ISIS’ Southeast Asian fighters 
so that they can train the next generation of ISIS combatants. 
Via these kinds of videos, ISIS attempts to attract more 
Southeast Asians to their cause and to encourage their 
migration (َةر"""""""""""""""""""""ْج"""""""ِه) to their caliphate.  Jasminder Singh, a 
researcher at the S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies, stated: “[Recently] there has been a surge in 
Indonesian and Malaysian language material posted by ISIS 
online”. According to official reports, ISIS has already 
succeeded in extending its influence to Southeast Asia 
through local radical groups. The idea of an in an Islamic 
caliphate in Southeast Asia spanning Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Brunei, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and southern 
Thailand is being widely propagated by these local e-jihadists.  
 Secondly, the internet has proved a potent recruiting tool 
for ISIS. While the internet has not completely replaced 
traditional methods of recruitment many experts believe that 
internet-based recruitment systems are growing rapidly. The 
decentralized nature of the Internet and the associated 
difficulty in curbing online propaganda and recruitment make 
it more appealing to terrorist activity. Many ISIS affiliated 
websites in Southeast Asia not only give advice to their 
followers on how to undertake terrorist activity in their own 
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countries but also go so far as to support them financially. 
Indonesian officials believe the 2002 terrorist bombings in 
Bali were financed through such an online source. 
 Recently Malaysian authorities arrested a group of 
extremists who used Facebook to recruit locals for ISIS. 
Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, the Malaysian Minister of Home 
Affairs, claimed that more than 70 percent of ISIS jihadists 
from Southeast Asia are recruited online. Indeed social media 
in Malaysia has not only become a primary tool for exposing 
Malaysians to ISIS ideology but it is also being used to pass 
along information to interested individuals on how to travel to 
Syria and Iraq to join ISIS.
 Lotfi Ariffin, a former member of PAS (Malaysia Pan 
Islamic Party), was killed while fighting for ISIS in Syria—just 
one prominent example of a Malaysian involved in ISIS 
terrorist activities. He and his brother used to propagate 
jihadist activities on social media. On his Facebook page 
(which has more than 20,000 followers), Ariffin openly 
promoted IS ideology and sought to influence youth in the 
region. While his account has since been suspended many 
Facebook pages and blogs continue to follow the jihadist 
example he set. The Tribute Asyyahid Ustaz Lotfi Ariffin 
Facebook page and the Blog Rasmi Briged Kibaran Bendera 
are examples of such activities, the latter of which has more 
than 2 million followers and is linked to a similarly-inspired 
YouTube account. 
 Influenced by ISIS’ online presence, some Southeast 
Asian extremist groups have already pledged allegiance to the 
group.  Furthermore, ISIS online activity has even inspired 
the establishment of new jihadist groups. Majmu’ah al-
Arkhabiliy is one such new Indonesian-Malaysian terrorist 
group in Raqqah, Syria under the command of ISIS. It claims 
91
Blog Rasmi Briged Kibaran Bendera
over a hundred Malaysians and Indonesians as members of 
the unit.
 Besides just recruiting fighters from Southeast Asia, 
dozens of local women have been encouraged to join the IS 
Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and to participate in Jihad Al 
Nikah, contributing to extremist activities through marrying 
combatants. These women are exposed to ISIS ideology via 
social networks until they decide to migrate to Syria.  Before 
the rise of the Internet and social media, Southeast Asian 
authorities only had to control mosques and other religious 
gatherings, such as Friday prayers, to hinder Islamic 
extremism. New ICT and social media have heightened the 
challenge of dealing with radicalism and have amplified the 
threat. 
2- Returning Jihadists
 In the 1980s, during the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, over 700 Southeast Asian jihadists joined in the 
war. Upon their return some of these local jihadists formed 
their own terrorist groups including Jammah Islamyah and 
the Abu Sayyaf group. During the Afghan war, many 
Southeast Asian Muslims joined the mujahadeen and were 
influenced by Al Qaeda ideology; however, currently more 
than 1000 jihadists are fighting in Iraq and. Thus, ISIS is 
proving itself more organized and more sophisticated than Al-
Qaeda and could pose a more serious threat than its 
predecessor.
 Local jihadists who spent time with IS militants 
eventually return with their radical ideology and a new set of 
military capabilities. Upon their return, similar to those 
returning militants in the 1980s, they may pass their tactical 
skills and violent ideology on to local extremist groups and 
revive them. 
 Ansyaad Mbai, the head of Indonesia’s National 
Counter-terrorism Agency, recently stated the main concern 
of Southeast Asian governments is returning fighters and 
what they will do upon their arrival back in the region.[6] 
These returning militants may help a new generation of 
jihadism to take root in their home countries and inspire a 
new generation of Muslim extremists. As an Indonesian 
expert stated: “They will return to their homes across the 
world, repeating what happened when fighters in Afghanistan 
returned. A new wave of international terrorism will likely 
recur.”[7] 
 Hishammudin Hussein, the defense minister of 
Malaysia, recently announced his concern over the 
establishment ISIS branches in Malaysia, Brunei and 
Indonesia.[8] Some of these returning jihadists had been 
directly involved in ISIS terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq. 
Ahmad Tarmimi Maliki, a 26 year-old Malaysian who carried 
explosives to the ISIS headquarters in Iraq, is just one such 
example. He was Malaysia’s first suicide bomber with known 
links to ISIS. He participated in a terrorist attack on Iraqi 
soldiers at their SWAT headquarters in Baghdad which caused 
more than 20 deaths. Details of the attack were published on 
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the ISIS website and Maliki was widely praised as Martyr 
(د""ي""ه""""""""""""""""""ش).[9] Zulkifli Binhir, also known as Marwan, Southeast 
Asia’s top terror suspect, is another Malaysian who was killed 
in January 2015 by the Filipino security forces. He was the 
FBI’s most wanted terrorist and a notorious bomb-maker for 
terrorist groups throughout the region.[10]
 Some of the Malaysians and Indonesians known to have 
joined IS have been spotted in propaganda beheading videos. 
Malaysia officials believe these people are the members of 
Majmuah Arkhability, a new joint Malaysian-Indonesian 
militant group within Islamic Caliphate territory.[11] In 
Indonesia, previously the base of dangerous terrorist groups 
such as Jammah Islamyah (JI), many old and new jihadist 
groups have begun supporting ISIS and its ideology. In 
addition to JI, Jammah Anshurat Tauhid and Aktivis Syairiad 
Islam have already pledged their allegiance to ISIS. Recently 
Abu Bakar Bashir, a famous Indonesian Islamic extremist and 
the spiritual leader of Southeast Asia’s extremist network, has 
beseeched his followers to support ISIS.[12]
 According to official estimates, the number of 
Indonesians joining ISIS has soared from 56 in mid-2014 to 
over 110 by the end of the same year. 
 It seems ISIS ideology in Indonesia is even proving 
popular among scholars and journalists. Abu Shoilah 
Attamarowi and M.Fachry are scholars who organized a 
gathering in Jakarta to pledge their support for ISIS.[13] A 
similar ceremony was organized by ISIS supports in Solo Baru 
in July 2014. The previous president of Indonesia, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, labeled ISIS as humiliating to Muslims 
and banned any support for this group. The current 
government of Indonesia maintained the ban on jihadist 
activities; however, ISIS ideology is still being widely 
propagated in Indonesia. General Tito Karnavian, Indonesia’s 
National Police Inspector worried that ISIS is providing 
“oxygen” to local extremist groups. He added that those 
Indonesians who have joined ISIS will likely return home with 
sophisticated combat training and will spread their extremist 
ideologies to others.[14] 
 In its most recent report, IPAC (the Institute for Policy 
Analysis of Conflict) warned the Indonesian government and 
other regional leaders about ISIS hubs in the country and 
urged better monitoring of the movements of ISIS 
sympathizers.[15] To impede ISIS recruitment, Indonesia 
security services are keeping a close watch on extremist group 
and have even gone so far as to invalidate passports of local 
jihadists who have become ISIS members.
 In the Philippines, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Fighters (BIFF) and the Abu Sayyaf group have already 
declared their allegiance to ISIS.[16] A BIFF spokesman 
confirmed their alliance with Islamic State in a video 
uploaded  to YouTube. Filipino forces are embroiled in a 
battle against Islamic extremism in the south of the country 
and even withstood a terrorist attack in January 2015 in 
which more than 44 counter-terrorist police commandos were 
killed in a bombing by Abdul Basil Usman.[17] According to 
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official reports, ISIS has also gained ground among 
radicalized Muslims in Mindanao; however, there remains no 
official consensus among  Filipino rebel and terrorist groups. 
While some of them such as Abu Sayyaf and BIFF have 
already pledged allegiance to ISIS, MILF and MNLF which 
feature a more nationalistic identity have condemned ISIS 
and vowed to halt the dangerous virus of extremism in the 
region.
3- The world wide Caliphate
 In July of 2014, Abu Bakar Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, 
declared the establishment of a worldwide caliphate. In his 
statement Baghdadi summoned Muslims across the globe to 
join IS. He stated, “[y]our brothers all over the world are 
waiting for your rescue, and are anticipating your 
brigades.”[18] The heart of Islamic State’s doctrine is a belief 
in the apocalypse and the fulfillment of the prophecy 
according to the Qur’an. According to the religious narratives 
of the hadith, particularly those contributed to the Prophet 
Mohammad, the final apocalyptic battle will take place 
between Muslims and infidels. On the day of judgment, which 
is said will take place in Syria, Muslims’ savior, the Mahdi, 
and Jesus Christ will appear together and summon their 
Muslim army against the infidels (kafir). According to the 
prophecy, on that day all people have to convert to Islam 
otherwise they will be considered enemies. The Qur’an states 
that the victory of Muslims is inevitable. While there are a 
wide variety of prophecies in Islamic texts, ISIS has mainly 
focused on the Dabiq hadith which is attributed to 
Mohammad. The prophecy says, “The last hour would not 
come until the Romans would land at Al-Amaq (Dabiq).” 
Dabiq, a small city in Syria, is the location of the apocalyptic 
final battle where the Romans will land and, after a bloody 
battle, suffer defeat at the hands of the Muslim army. In order 
to draw a parallel between the Dabiq prophecy and their own 
campaigns, IS jihadists captured Dabiq in a showy effort to 
prepare the scene for judgment day. Dabiq is only a small 
town of little strategic importance; however, the location 
holds great value as a propaganda tool as after its capture, IS 
supporters all around the word tweeted photos of the city with 
quotes from the hadith.
 Whether ISIS terrorists really believe this prophecy or 
whether it is just a part of their strategy, apocalypticism is 
feeding their ideology and justifying their violent acts.
 ISIS even releases a magazine named Dabiq. Besides 
being a news platform, the magazine expounds the agenda of 
the Islamic Caliphate and seeks to justify ISIS’s violent 
strategies. The third issue of the magazine “The Call to 
Hijrah” encourages all Muslims across the globe to migrate 
(َةر"""""""""""""""""""""ْج"""ِه) to the Islamic Caliphate and to participate in the holy 
war as a precursor to the final apocalyptic battle.  One of the 
articles in this issue, “Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity,” 
elaborates on the concept of a worldwide caliphate in the 
context of religious migration (َةر"""""""""""""""""""""ْج""ِه). Referring to the Qur’an 
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and the hadith (ث"""""يدا"""""حأ), Muslims today are being portrayed as 
hopeless people who would dream of hijrat (migration) from 
the lands of infidels to the lands of jihad. The writer continues 
on that the caliphate is an Islamic utopia which accepts all 
Muslims regardless of their nationality and does all it can to 
protect them. According to the article, religious migration is 
an obligation for today’s Muslims, especially after the 
establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.
 Back-page photo of the fourth issue of this magazine 
shows Southeast Asians who have already joined ISIS in Syria 
and Iraq to fulfill their religious obligation.
 Therefore the fast growing appeal of ISIS in Southeast 
Asia can be explained within the framework of the prophecy. 
Considering Southeast Asian Muslims’ strong commitment to 
Islamic beliefs and practices and the establishment of the 
Islamic Caliphate as a symbol of a supposedly unfolding 
prophecy , ISIS has the potential to wage a substantive 
campaign to charm Muslims in the region. ISIS has been 
actively attempting to luring Southeast Asia’s current 
generation of young Muslims to join their terrorist group. 
From the viewpoint of the small segment of suppressed and 
marginalized Muslims in Southeast Asia, Islamic State (IS) is 
the prophesized caliphate of the Mahdi and a utopia in which 
to experience true Islamic government. One significant 
example pertaining to ISIS’ appeal in Southeast Asia is the 
formation of the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah 
(The Malay Archipelago Unit of the Islamic State). This unit 
was established by Malaysian and Indonesian jihadists who 
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have joined IS. The formation of this group inside the 
territory of Islamic State has raised serious security concerns 
that these fighters may  pass along ISIS ideology to sleeping 
terrorist cells in the region and help to revive them upon their 
return to their home countries. According to the official 
reports, currently four new extremist groups have been 
formed in Malaysia. It is believed that these new jihadist 
groups are an outgrowth of the older radical groups in the 
region and they seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate in 
Southeast Asia. 
Conclusion
 The governments of the region are completely aware that 
the threat of ISIS is not confined to the Middle East and 
merits their attention and correspondingly serious measures 
to quell it. Learning from their past experience fighting 
against Al-Qaeda, Southeast Asian leaders consider terrorism 
as a long term security concern as well as a regional threat. 
They are highly concerned about the number of local jihadists 
in Iraq and Syria and what they will do upon their return 
home. To combat against this new wave of terrorism 
Southeast Asian governments have done a lot to curb the 
influence of ISIS in the region. They have taken serious 
measures to impede ISIS recruitment and have coordinated 
their counter terrorism activities.
 Counter ISIS measures in Southeast Asia could be 
implemented at different levels.
 At the national level, Indonesia’s government has 
encouraged moderate Muslim leaders to speak out and 
condemn ISIS. The government has also banned all types of 
propaganda supporting or sympathizing with ISIS, including 
YouTube videos. Malaysia, another Muslim-majority country 
in the region, has publicly condemned the violent acts of this 
terrorist group .The Malaysian police are monitoring social 
media to identify and arrest people suspected of terrorist 
activities. The Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tan Sri 
Muhyiddin Yasin, recently stated that strong measures like 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Pota) are needed to curb the 
threat of terrorism and radicalism in the country.[19]
 While Singapore is not a Muslim-majority country, the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have been contributing 
military assets to combat terrorism in the region. However, 
Singapore’s defense minister has announced that none of its 
combat troops will be sent to Iraq and Syria. To develop of 
national counter-terrorism strategy, countries must consider 
that the seeds of radicalism can only grow in fertile soil. Many 
Southeast Asian Muslims are motivated to engage in jihad due 
to the internal problems of their home countries just as much
—if not more than—external pull factors. The perpetual cycle 
of poverty, corruption, injustice, lack of democracy, and 
religious and ethnic discrimination can provide exactly the 
fertile soil needed for ISIS to takes root in the region. The 
strengthening of democracy and civil society along with 
political reform and greater governmental transparency could 
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prove the region’s most powerful weapons against ISIS’ 
dangerous, extremist message.
 Supporting civil and moderate interpretations of Islam 
should be another priority of Southeast Asian governments in 
order to counter the influence of the radical ideology of ISIS. 
 At the regional level, ASEAN has begun taking effective 
steps towards implementing counter-terrorism strategies to 
combat ISIS. At ASEAN’s 25th annual summit in Burma, 
member states expressed their concerns and commitment to 
fight ISIS as a new regional threat. ASEAN has also expanded 
its cooperation with other countries to strengthen local 
counter-terrorism capabilities. ASEAN plus Japan issued a 
declaration to improve their regional cooperation against 
terrorism. Attacking the ideologies at the root of terrorism, 
strengthening border and immigration controls, and 
conducting joint training programs are critical achievements 
of this major step forward.
 At the regional level, counter-terrorism cooperation 
should be boosted through stronger information sharing on 
returning jihadists. Monitoring suspected social media 
activities and enhancing cyber security measures could also 
help to blunt ISIS’ online presence. Finally, it must be stated 
that reducing the threat IS poses to Southeast Asia without 
addressing the internal factors which could foster its rise will 
be impossible. IS’ appeal in Southeast Asia derives from the 
region’s many internal problems including frustration, 
repression, corruption, religious and cultural extinction, 
marginalization, fragile democratic systems, and a lack of a 
strong civil society. The convergence of these catalysts with IS 
appealingly apocalyptic ideology are the two strongest factors 
driving the desire of Southeast Asian Muslims to join the 
Islamic caliphate. 
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